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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHELIA ANN COX, SUSAN KELLER
and SUSAN SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19257

ORRIN HATCH, UNION MEMBERS
FOR HATCH COMMITTEE, FRIENDS
FOR ORRIN HATCH COMMITTEE,
HATCH ELECTION COMMITTEE,
MICHAEL LEAVITT and JOHN DOES
I-X,
Defendants-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for injunctive relief and damages
based upon a statutory claim for abuse of personal identity
pursuant to §45-3-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
a.mended) and tort claims for defamation and invasion of
privacy.

(R.13-18)
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
This matter came before the Third District Court

for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
District Judge presiding, on defendants' Motion to Dismiss
on March 28, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. (R.49).

The Court heard the

arguments of counsel for the respective parties and took the

matter under advisement to consider the memorandum filed bv
the parties and to further consider the entire file.

On

April 5, 1983 the Court entered its memorandum decision

th~c

"the Defendimts' Motion to Dismiss should be granted on
constitutional grounds alone and the claims for abuse of
identity, defamation or invasion of privacy espoused by the
plaintiff need not be addressed." (R.84-86)

On April 19,

1983, the District Court entered its final order of dismissai
with prejudice as against Michael Leavitt and Orrin Hatch.
(R.101-103)

It is from this order that appellants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants seek reversal of the order entered by
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable
Timothy R. Hansen, presiding, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint
with prejudice and request an order of remand to the District
Court for a full trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants are employees of the United States
Postal Service, employed at the Main Salt Lake City Post
Office, located at 2100 South Redwood Road.

They are and

were members of the American Postal Workers Union.

(R.13)

On or about Labor Day, September 6, 1982, respondent Orrin
Hatch, along with his agents, came to the appellants' place
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of employment for the purpose of taking photographs to be
used in the political campaign for re-election to the United
State Senate of respondent Hatch.

(R.14)

A photograph was

taken of appellants standing near respondent Hatch. (R.14,
45, 53, 54, 90)

This photograph was subsequently printed in

a newspaper-like advertisement entitled, SENATOR ORRIN HATCH
LABOR LETTER, UNION MEMBERS FOR HATCH COMMITTEE.

(R.45)

This publication was authorized and paid for by the Friends
of Orrin Hatch Committee and was authorized by the Hatch
election cormnittee and the respondents.

Appellants' photograph

was used in this publication without their consent or authorization.

The use of this photograph in the political advertise-

ment described above, implied that appellants approved or
endorsed the re-election of respondent Hatch.

Appellants

have never endorsed the re-election of Hatch.

Further, as

employees of the federal government, they are specifically
precluded by federal law from publically approving or endorsing
any political candidate or actively participating in a
political campaign.

(R.16)

The appellants were harmed as

a result of the conduct of the respondents.
Subsequent to the publication of the appellants'
photograph in respondents' advertisement, appellants were
investigated by their employers and supervisors and their
union regarding the extent of their involvement and participation in Hatch's campaign.
-3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
AMENDED COMPLAINT IN THAT THE
APPELLANTS' PHOTOGRAPH IS NOT
UTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH OR

APPELLANTS'
USE OF
CONSTITEXPRESSION

It is well settled that the First Amendment freedom
of expression is not absolute.
It is clear that there is no "absolute" right to
freedom of expression. The government may impose
certain limitations on even clearly First Amendment
conduct; regulation of time, place and manner, for
example, is permissible. U.S. vs. Baranski, 484
Fed. 2d 556, 569 (1973).
The fact that some government restrictions placed
upon freedom of expression create a "chilling effect" in the
exercise of these rights is not sufficient to prohibit this
regulation.

In Younger vs. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51; 77 L.

Ed. 2d 669; 91 S. Ct. 746

(1971)

The Supreme Court stated

. . the existence of a "chilling effect," even
in the area of First Amendment Rights, has never
been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting State action. Where a
statute does not directly abridge free speech,
but - while regulating a subject within the State's
power - tends to have the incidental effect of
inhibiting First Amendment Rights, it is well
settled that the statute can be upheld if the
effect on speech is minor in relation to the
need for control of the conduct and a lack of
alternative means for doing so.
In this case, respondents Hatch and Leavitt prepared
a political advertisement for the purpose of obtaining support
and er,dorsement for Hatch' s re-election tu the United States
-4-

Senate.
(R.45)

This is clear from the nature of the advertisement.
The Court will note that on the last page of this

publication a return mail "reply" card is included.

In this

reply, respondents specifically solicit endorsements and request
a signed consent under the statement "Yes", I will endorse
Senator Hatch for re-election and allow my name to be used
in advertisements." [emphasis added](R.45)

Clearly, respondents

knew that consent was required for the use of one's name as
a portion of an advertisement endorsing Hatch's reelection
effort.
Utah Code Annotated §45-3-3 (1953, as amended)
defines abuse of personal identity as follows:
The personal identity of an individual is abused
if:
(1) an advertisement is published in which
the personal identity of that individual is used
in a manner which expresses or implies that the
individual approves, endorses, has endorsed or
will endorse the specific subject matter of the
advertisement; and (2) consent has not been
obtained for such from the individual, .
Respondents contend that this statute is a unconstitutional restriction on their right to free expression.
This, notwithstanding their attempts to obtain this required
consent from other potential endorsers.

In the instant

case, appellants were never asked if they would permit their
photograph with the Senator to be used in an advertisement.
They were never informed that this photograph would be so
used by the respondents.

They were not even extended the
-5-

opportunity to make the choice as to the use of their likenes,
or identity in this photograph and by the respondents

Tn

the contrary, respondents made this choice for the appellants
Clearly the legislative intent in the adoption of
the abuse of personal identity statute was to provide an
individual a choice as to whether or not he or she will
allow their likeness or their name to be used in an advertiseme·
endorsing some subject matter.

The provisions of this

statute show that the legislature intended to avoid such
wrongful use by requiring consent to be obtained prior to
the use of one's identity in an advertisement.

This statute

is a reasonable restriction on the manner of expression.

As

the Supreme Court stated in Younger vs. Harris, supra,
Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such
statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect admittedly
can result from the very existence of certain laws
on the statute books does not in itself justify
prohibiting the state from carrying out the
important and necessary task of enforcing these
laws against socially harmful conduct that the
State believes in good faith to be punishable
under its laws and the constitution.
In the case at bar, the statute is one of general
applicability.

It in no way restricts or regulates the

content of any expression.

The Utah abuse of personal

identity statute requires only that prior to the use of one s
likeness or name in a context which implies an endorsement.
the speaker or publisher must obtain consent from the putative
-6-

~ndorser

so as to avoid deceptive or unfair endorsement in

advertising.
It is clear that the First Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press
that may result from the enforcement of civil or
criminal statutes of general applicability. Under
prior cases, otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be enforced against the
press as against others, despite the possible
burden that may be imposed. The Court has emphasized that "The publisher of a newspaper
has no special immunity from the application of
general laws. He has no special privileges
to invade the rights of others. [Emphasis added]
Branzburg vs. Hayes 408 U.S. 665, 683; 33 L.
Ed. 2d 626, 640; 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972) citing
Associated Press vs. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-133;
81 L. Ed. 953, 96l; 57 S. Ct. 650 (1937)
The respondents in this case should be allowed no
greater protection than the organized press or any other citizen.
The Utah legislature has specifically adopted methods by
which an advertiser, be he a political advertiser or otherwise,
may obtain and utilize the endorsements of others.

This

legislative purpose is clearly meant to avoid the invasion
of the rights of others.
The prevailing view is that the press is not free
to publish with immunity everything and anything
it desires to publish. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra.
The appellants submit that respondents' failure to
comply with the provisions of §45-3-1 et seq Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) is not justified based upon
their allegations that the unconsented use of the photograph
of the appellants is "political speech" and is therefore
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unconditionally protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

It is clear that some

restrict 1 ,~

even in the area of "political speech," are valid.
The guarantees of the first amendment have never
meant "that people who want to propagandize protests
or views have a constitutional right to do so
wherever, however and whenever they please."
Greer vs. Stock, 424 U.S. 828, 836; 47 L. Ed. 2d
505, 513; 9 S. Ct. 1211 (1976) citing Adderly vs.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48; 17 L. Ed. 2d 149; 87 S.
Ct. 242.
In this case respondents apparently determined
that Senator Hatch's views on labor and unions needed to be
propagandized in his effort to obtain support from Utah
union members in his bid for re-election.

This decision

alone, in the context of a re-election, does not extend any
constitutional right to propagandize Senator Hatch's views,
whenever, however and wherever he or his campaign staff choose
. . the essence of time, place or manner
regulation lies in the recognition that various
methods of speech, regardless of their content,
may frustrate legitimate governmental goals.
Consolidated Edison vs. Public Services Commission,
447 U.S. 530, 535; 65 L. Ed. 2d 319, 326; loo s.
Ct. 2326 (1980)
U.C.A. §45-3-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) is a
reasonable restriction on the manner of expression one may
employ in advertisements.

This statute does not limit the

type of advertisement to which it applies.

It does not

restrict what one may advertise but rather how one may adverti'·
Therefore, the restriction is a reasonable one of time, piace
-8-

and manner and should not be overruled on the basis of
respondents' claimed constitutionally protected speech.
POINT II
FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES ARE NOT
APPLICABLE IN THIS HATTER
First Amendment guarantees of open exchanges of
ideas and robust discussion of issues during a political
campaign are not applicable to this case.
The United States Supreme Court in a series of
cases beginning with New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), established that certain defamatory publications were protected by First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press
in libel actions brought by public officials against critics
of their official conduct.

In such libel actions, the

Supreme Court held that public officials were prohibited
from recovering damages for defamation relating to official
conduct unless it was proven that the statement was made
with "actual malice."

In the cases of Curtis Publishing Co.

vs. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) and Associated Press vs.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) the Court extended the New York
Times standard to publications concerning "public figures."
In Monitor Patriot Co. vs. Roy, 401 U.S. 265
(1971), the New York Times standard was extended to apply to
candidates for public office as well as public officials.
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The Court stated:
And if it be conceded that Lhe First Amendment was
"fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange ot
ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people" . . . then
it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent applicaci,
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for politica'.
office.
Id. at 272.
The Court went on to say:
The considerations that led us to reformulate the
"official conduct" rule of New York Times in terms
of "anything which might touch on official fitness
for office" apply with special force to the case
of the candidate. Indeed, whatever vitality the
"official conduct" concept may retain with regard
to occupants of public office, . . . it is clearly
of little applicability in the context of an
election campaign. The principle activity of a
candidate in our political system, his "office,"
so to speak, consists in putting before the voters
every conceivable aspect of his public and private
life that he thinks may lead the electorate to
gain a good impression of him.
Id. at 274.
The Court has, however, rejected extention of the
constitutional privilege to include publications concerning
any "public issue" regardless of the defamed party's status
in Gertz vs. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

There, the Court

discussed the factors which distinguish the state interest
in compensating private individuals for defamatory statements
from the analogous interest involved in the context of
public persons.
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of
effective communicati~n and hence h3ve 3 more
-10-

Id.

realistic opportunity to counteract false statements
than private individuals normally enjoy. Private
individuals are therefore more vulnerable to
injury, and the state interest in protecting them
is correspondingly greater . . . more important
than the likelihood that private individuals will
lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there
is a compelling normative consideration underlying
the distinction between public and private defamation
plaintiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences
of that involvement in public affairs. He runs
the risk of closer public scrutiny than might
otherwise be the case. Society's interest in the
officers in government is not strictly limited to
formal discharge of duties . . . . Those classed as
public figures stand in similar positions.
The Court went on to say that instances of involuntary

public figures would be exceedingly rare and that:

Id

for the most part, those who attain this status
have assumed roles of special prominence in the
affairs of society. Some occupied positions of
such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment . . . [A
private individual] has not accepted public office
or assumed an "individual role in ordering society"
. . . he has relinquished no part of his interest
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the Court
for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory
falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only
more vulnerable to injury than public officials
and public figures, they are also more deserving
of recovery.
at 345.
The use of plaintiffs' photograph by the respondents

is not within the coverage of the constitutional privilege
-11-

elaborated by the United States Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs

are private individuals, not public officials or public fig

0

,

They are not candidates for political office or those who
"have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolutions
of the issues involved." In fact, as postal employees, they
are prohibited by the Hatch Act from actively participating
in political campaigns.

The misuse of their photograph in

respondents campaign advertising is not a part of any politici
discussion on "vital public issues."

Such protection would

be given to Orrin Hatch making statements as to his opponent':
political beliefs and policies; no such protection should be
given to Orrin Hatch publically and falsely saying that he is
endorsed by three ordinary members of the public, the plaintif'
in this action.

The respondents' conduct in falsely implying

endorsement of Orrin Hatch by the plaintiffs is not entitled
to any constitutional privilege.
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CONCLUSION
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated §45-3-1
et seq. (1953 as amended) are reasonable restrictions as to
time, place and manner of advertising; those provisions are
permissible restriction upon free speech even of a political
nature.

The respondents violated the Abuse of Personal Identity

Act and are not entitled to claim immunity from that statutory
provision simply because they were involved in a political
campaign.
The plaintiffs-appellants as members of the public,
and not public figures, are entitled to the protections of
the laws regarding defamation and invasion of privacy.

Orrin

Hatch in a political campaign has no right to falsely imply
that the plaintiffs, union members, endorse his re-election,
and thereby jeoparize
reputations.

their employment and harm their

Free speech in the context of a political campaign

protects the expression and debate about the candidates and
about the issues; free speech does not allow a candidate to
falsely imply that three ordinary members of the public
and endorse the re-election of Orrin Hatch.

support

The Court below

did not examine the merits of this action but dismissed the
plaintiffs' amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure with a ruling that the United States
Constitution allows a political candidate to defame the reputation,
-13-

invade the privacy and abuse the identity of ordinary citizen,
with immunity in a political campaign.

Such a conclusion is

not supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court nor by the clear intent of the Utah State Legislature
to reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of

advertisi·~

The decision of the Court below should be reversed
and this matter remanded for a full trial on the merits.
DATED this 5th day of October, 1983.
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